



C.I.H.S BULLETIN

Issue 48

ISSN 1485 - 8460

April 2006

The Canadian Immigration Historical Society • P O Box 9502, Station T • Ottawa ON K1G 3V2 • cihs@ncf.ca • <http://cihs.ncf.ca/index.htm>

Ed. Note

This issue starts with 'housekeeping' matters from the 2005 Annual General Meeting and includes the address [on p.3] by Gerry Van Kessel on the subject of the status of immigrants (a Canadian term) in Europe today. The second part of the issue, while on the familiar theme of refugees, breaks new ground for the Society since the period covered is less than ten years ago [Kosovo, p. 7]—still 'historical' but almost contemporary.

CIHS Annual General Meeting

November 16, 2005

President's Speaking Notes:

Ladies and gentlemen:

I would like to thank you for coming out tonight and to welcome you to our 2005 AGM.

Two thousand and five has been a pretty good year for the CIHS in terms of both activities and accomplishments.

We have already managed to publish two very full *Bulletins* and there will be a third in the next few days. I was particularly pleased with the issue on the 1968 Czechoslovakian Refugee Movement. I think that that *Bulletin* captures both the spirit and mood of the times and records a lot of information about how the decision to resettle the Czechs was made and about how the operation in Vienna was organized and managed that has never been published before.

I was in Windsor last month and had the pleasure of meeting Mr and Mrs. Stvan and Gregor the two families that contributed to the "Czech Mates" *Bulletin* and was very moved about what they had to say about the lives they built for themselves in Canada. Our beloved Treasurer Emeritus, Al Troy, summed it up very succinctly when he wrote across the top of his membership

renewal cheque... "The Czech bulletin was worth the 10 bucks."

I have also been pleased with our new "Original Documents" feature which will be a regular part of our *Bulletins* for the foreseeable future. We are trying to select documents that cast a light on some aspect of Canadian immigration history. You will see in the next number that we have done a very crafty job of matching the featured document with one of the articles.

We have a number of excellent articles in the preparation stage: origins of the Refugee Sponsorship program and the Bosnian Refugee movement to name but a couple.

In the course of this last year we have renewed our long standing ties with Citizenship and Immigration Canada's Library. In August the Library hosted a very classy and well attended event to mark the presentation of Roger St. Vincent's self-published autobiography *A Fortunate Life*. I brought a copy of the book tonight and members may want to have a look.

We are joined to night by two fine CIC officers from the Library, Marie Claude Lacombe and Lisa Forbes, who, as you can see, are wearing vintage Immigration uniforms. You know it is sad to reflect that with the absorption of our Port of Entry people into the Canadian Border Service Agency, Immigration uniforms are a thing of the past.

I would like to ask these ladies to please come forward. We have had the ten VHS tapes of the 1992 *Journey to Hope* symposium on the Uganda Refugee Movement converted to DVD format. I would ask Lisa and Marie Claude to accept them on behalf of the CIC Library as a gift of the Canadian Immigration Historical Society.

This year marked the retirement of two hard working members of the CIHS Executive Peter Current and Del McKay. Peter has managed the society's finances for the last five years and of course Del has edited the *Bulletin* over the last decade. On behalf of the Society I would like to thank you both for your long and faithful service.

While the 'thank you's' are being handed out, I'd like to thank Bud Muise for auditing our books and Susan Gregson and Jan Rankin for reviewing them.

There are a couple of items we will need to focus on in the coming year.

First, we need to redesign and organize our web site and I would be very keen to know if anyone in the membership would be

willing to take this on. If not, I think we will need to spend some money and get some professional help. I plan to tackle that project early in the new year.

Second, David Bullock, who is now editing the *Bulletin*, is in the final stages of launching *Bulletin* #47. That means that, in the normal course of events we will reach the magic number 50 about this time next year. I think we should do something special to mark the occasion. I am of course open to suggestions but I've been wondering about publishing a book that would feature the *Best of the Bulletins*. It would mean that we would have to put together a little panel to re-read the entire series and to choose the articles that have stood up the best over the years. I think something like that would be of interest to members, it could perhaps be replicated on our revised web site and I think it could be a useful tool in helping to recruit more corporate members.

Over the last year two significant members of our immigration community passed away. I am referring to Bud Curry and Don Pelton. We should take a moment to remember them.

On a more happy note I am glad to recognize Gerry Van Kessel who has returned to Canada from an important assignment in Geneva and who has agreed to join the Executive once again. We will be hearing from Gerry about his experiences in a few minutes.

We have been able to recruit a number of new members this year and I am glad to report that I heard today from the former manager of CIC Kitchener, indicating an interest in contributing to the Society's work. We have always been light on membership from the Canadian field. I hope that involving a CIC manager of enormous experience, whom I got to know when I was in Ontario Region, will help us reflect the domestic immigration experience in our publication.

Finally I would like to thank the members of the Executive who put in so many hours on the Society's business over the last year. My thanks go to Joe Bissett, Susan Gregson, Raph Girard and to Ian Rankin for your efforts and support. It also needs to be said that the CIHS owes a very large debt to David Bullock, who assumes the role of Editor and to Al Gunn our efficient and dedicated Secretary. I said last year the Al and David were the pillars of the Society and they still are.

Thank you.

President's Addendum

A number of participants volunteered on the spot to assist in selecting articles for the 50th Bulletin project.

There was a lively discussion about the prospect of more active fundraising to permit the CIHS to get its work out to a wider audience. The Executive Committee will review the matter in January and devise a set of goals and objectives. Ian Rankin has agreed to take the lead in this regard.

It was suggested and agreed that CIHS members make themselves available to CIC for training purposes. Again Ian Rankin will endeavour to facilitate this.

Following Gerry Van Kessel's interesting remarks comparing the

Canadian and European immigration experience, members participated in an hour-long discussion of immigration challenges and pressures.

Election of Officers

The nominating committee recommends the election of the following members. This includes serving members who have agreed to accept another term.

Executive

President – Mike Molloy

Vice-President – J. Bissett

Treasurer – R. Girard

Editor, Bulletin – D. Bullock

Secretary – A. Gunn

Directors at large

(alphabetical order)

J. Cross (BC)

S. Gregson

G. Komar (Prairies)

I. Rankin

B. Sinclair (Maritimes)

G. Van Kessel

There were no nominations from the floor, and the slate, as presented, was declared elected by acclamation.

1950s PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

I am a researcher from the University of Ottawa seeking information pertaining to Palestinian refugees from Lebanon and Jordan who came to Canada in the 1950s.

I am particularly interested in speaking to past/current government employees (DFAIT and CIC), United Nations officials or Palestinian refugees knowledgeable about this period.

Contact information:

Marilyn Sweet
mswee093@uottawa.ca or
marilynsweet@hotmail.com
613-236-0388

CIHS Balance Sheet

April 30, 2005
(Includes unrealized gains)
As of 30/04/05

Account	Balance
ASSETS	
Cash and Bank Accounts	
CIHS Operating Account	955.09
Petty Cash Account	49.96
TOTAL Cash and Bank Accounts	1005.05
INVESTMENTS	
BMO Investment Account	6118.48
TOTAL Investments	6118.48
TOTAL ASSETS	7123.53
LIABILITIES & EQUITY	
liabilities 0	
equity 7123.53	
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY	7123.53

CIHS Operating Account

Cash Flow Report FY 2004/05
01/05/04 Through 30/04/05

Category Description	01/05/04— 30/04/05
INCOME	
BMO Interest	0.58
Membership-Corp	1000.00
Membership-Gen	410.00
TOTAL INCOME	1410.58
EXPENSES	
Catering AGM	675.93
Registration	30.00
Room rental	40.02
Shipping Exp	851.19
Web Site Fee	100.00
TOTAL EXPENSES	1697.14
TOTAL INCOME - EXPENSES	-286.56

Europe and Immigration Through A Canadian Lens

Remarks for the 2005 Annual General Meeting of the CIHS

by **Gerry Van Kessel**

I want to thank Mike for the invitation so speak to you today. The Canadian Immigration Historical Society is one that I am particularly partial to as I was there at the beginning. This is the second time I have been asked to speak at the annual general meeting. The other time I spoke about the policy and practice of refugee determination in Canada.

Mike asked me to speak to you about Europe and immigration. I know that among Mike's many talents is his ability to see ahead but I doubt that even he would know that between the time that he asked me to speak and today the riots in France would give this topic a currency and an immediacy everywhere and not just in Europe and among immigration specialists.

My career has given me the opportunity to think about immigration and the many issues that modern wealthy societies have to face in responding to the challenges of the easy and large

scale cross-border flow of peoples from the poorer parts of the world. Working for CIC means that I see these issues through a Canadian lens. Working and living in Geneva as Coordinator of IGC, an intergovernmental body that has mostly European states as members has allowed me to learn more about the continent of my birth and the way it deals with immigration. This is a rather different lens. At the same time I was involved in immigration issues concerning Africa and Asia so my outlook broadened considerably.

What I have learned in these last four years has certainly broadened my outlook and made me realize that the way most of the world looks at this issue is quite different from how Canadians see and experience it. It also makes me aware how history and experience are such major determinants in public policy. If our history and experience paralleled that of Europe I think our approach towards immigration would be quite similar to Europe's. The challenge, whether in Canada, Europe or elsewhere is how to respond when history and experience appear to demand a new approach.

The comments I am going to make are very much my own. They will no doubt differ in emphasis from those of other observers including some of you here. You will understand that I cannot do full justice in the next 15-20 minutes to the complexity and range of issues that Europe faces and the subtleties and differences that abound among European countries and approaches to immigration. But I hope that you will find that what I have to say is interesting and worthwhile.

Let me start with a general observation that grew on me more and more the longer I was in Europe. For those who have visited Europe and and who have lived there it is obvious that there are many immigrants in Europe, many of them from so-called non-traditional source countries. The number of 'foreign born' per capita living in many European countries is roughly the same as

in Canada. I remember my first visits to The Hague about ten years ago. What struck me was that at that time was that The Hague appeared more multiracial than did Ottawa.

Therefore, Europe and Canada both have large numbers of immigrants. In Canada it is by design; in Europe, it is largely by default. Speaking generally, it is public policy in Europe to oppose immigration. Yet, this needs to be explained as the policy opposes economic immigration but accepts refugee claimants, family reunion and neglects in a benign way illegal workers. A result is that Canada chooses the immigrants it takes. In Europe, it is immigrants who choose Europe; European governments are hardly involved if at all. Most people, including almost all refugee claimants, entering Europe illegally do so with the help of smugglers. As a result one could say to make the point that in Europe it is smugglers rather than governments who are determining Europe's future population mix.

In Canada immigration is part of our national myth. We know that without immigration there would not have been a country called Canada. This means that immigration starts out as something that is positive. This is a starting point that Europe lacks. Europeans feel that their states are complete. To suggest to them that immigration has a role in the evolution of their societies would appear bizarre.

Subconsciously, I believe, Europeans still see themselves as immigrant sending countries rather than immigrant receiving. This has some logic as over the last few centuries about 50 million Europeans have emigrated. It is only within the time of our generation that the situations has reversed. Yet, this means a clash with subconscious and with the reality on the ground. On the ground it cannot be denied that Europe is an immigrant receiving region.

This absence of policy has many consequences. Let me start with a rather mundane one but yet very telling. A few years ago I was asked to speak in Brussels about immigration statistics in the European Union. To my surprise there was no data on immigrant numbers and flows. Data was restricted to foreign-born stocks. In Canada we know how many immigrants are landed annually. In addition we know an almost endless number of breakdowns of this number – gender, language, nationality, country of former residence, citizenship, age, education, class of selection. In thinking about this it suddenly emerged that not having such data was quite logical. How can one collect data about an area for which there is no policy?

One reason there is no policy is that Europeans are not convinced there is a need for immigration. You will have heard much that Europeans are not replacing themselves and that as a result immigration is needed. Europe sees itself as full. More people are not needed. Europeans are getting older but not yet fewer. Living in Europe makes this a logical conclusion. There are line-ups everywhere. Traffic jams are horrendous. Housing shortages are serious. Unemployment in some countries – France and Germany – are high and for some immigrant groups very high. Given high unemployment it seems logical to ask why

immigrants are needed for the labour market. All of this makes it understandable that there is a reluctance to use immigration for the purpose of about immigration as a means to counter population decline.

Another reason, perhaps even the major one, is that for many Europeans their experience with immigration since the end of World War II has been problematic. In Canada, the public regards the experience as positive. It is my belief that for the public the success of immigration is whether immigrants are seen as 'givers' or 'takers'. By 'givers' I mean immigrants who contribute to the well-being of the country. By 'takers' I mean immigrants who draw down rather than add to the national wealth. There are many examples of the former (Nicholas Sarkozy has a Hungarian father and a Greek mother) but the prevailing view is that immigrants are 'takers'. Why is this the case and does the public perception have credibility?

Most immigrants to Europe arrived as temporary workers or 'guest workers', as refugee claimants, as family members or as illegals. Guest workers came in large number mostly in the 1950s and 1960s. But they remained and can hardly be called guests any longer. Yet official policy until very recently was that they would be going home. This was notwithstanding the fact that their children brought wives from the old country and had no knowledge perhaps other than an idealized version of the old country.

In Germany it was the case a few years ago that the German government paid for Turkish language classes for the second and third generation of Turkish guest workers on the grounds that this would prepare them for their return to Turkey. In Germany nationality provisions have been changed recently so that the Turks living in Germany can receive German citizenship. Before 2000 this was not the case. I suggest that this was as confusing to the Turks as to the German public. It had to make them question where they really belonged. What we see here as elsewhere is a considerable distance between stated policy and practice.

Let me turn to refugee claimants. Europe has received more than 7 million applications for refugee status in the last 23 years. The approval rate has been low – less than 20 percent if we include humanitarian approvals – but the stay rate has been very high. There are very few removals. One study showed that the refugee approval rate for a group was about 5%. This was higher than the removal rate. So, effectively the stay rate was about 95%. After some years many were allowed to remain under one or other humanitarian program and the rest went underground. Generally, refugee claimants have little education and limited labour market skills. A Dutch study of more than 100,000 refugee claimants showed over half with less than completed primary education.

Again here we have the distance between policy and practice. A policy designed to appeal to the population's better instincts – the need to protect people from return to persecution – results in what governments maintain it is their policy to avoid, namely, economic immigration. The refugee claimant system is much more about immigration than about refugee protection. The

public might have been more accepting had the failed refugee claimants been more successful as the economic immigrants they really were.

Family immigration followed. It shared many of the characteristics of refugee claimants with respect to education and job readiness. And as I will mention shortly this has consequences for integration.

With this as a background, one might conclude that these negatives could be overcome if only immigrants were able to become the 'givers' I have already mentioned. This would mean that they work and contribute to society. Unfortunately, Europe's labour and social policies and practices make this difficult. They are what make many Europeans proud and distinguishes them from the United States (and Britain). The rights of workers are protected and the needs of the unemployed and unemployable are well provided for.

The problem for many immigrants is that they cannot penetrate the labour market because jobs for them are not there, they are not adequately qualified, their reputation scares off employers and the general population is further confirmed in its stereotypical views of immigrants. So, they are on generous social assistance, hardly a way to ensure integration and public acceptance. This problem is serious. Unemployment levels for many immigrant groups are three times the average. In Denmark, more than half of male immigrants have never held a job.

Given this situation it is not surprising that Europeans see immigrants as 'takers' rather than 'givers'. In Canada there is no doubt that there are 'takers' as well but overall the public view is much more positive. Immigrants are generally seen as 'givers' and it is because this is the case that Canadians are willing to live with some 'takers'. The European Union and some European states are now trying to gain public support for economic immigrants. While the United Kingdom and Ireland are making real headway, the rest of Europe is not. The irony is that without economic immigrants there will be too few 'givers' and too many 'takers' and the public's doubts about immigration will not change.

I am skeptical that we will see much movement in the direction of economic immigration in most of Europe for the foreseeable future. It seems to me that European governments have little credibility with their publics on their ability to manage immigration. They promised temporary migration but the immigrants remain well into the third generation. The Geneva Refugee Convention is seen as overrun by abusers, abusers who stay and benefit from a policy designed for those in need. And now, governments are talking about the need for economic immigration. I am not surprised that their publics lack much confidence that the reality will match the promise.

The final test for immigration policy is integration. Are immigrants settling in without too many problems, are they contributing to their new country, are they accepting the values of their new country, to sum up, is integration working? For many Europeans the answer is no. Examples abound. Most recently there are the riots in France, not of disaffected students

as in 1968, but of disaffected second and third generation immigrants mostly from North Africa. In the United Kingdom, which has had more success in integration than the rest of Europe (immigrants from India have the same incomes as 'traditional' Brits), the July London bombings raised fears because the alleged terrorists were British born. In the Netherlands the public mood started to turn when young Dutch of mostly Moroccan descent celebrated the September 9, 2001 attack on the US. Then, the ritual killing of Theo van Gogh by a fluent Dutch speaking person of Moroccan descent further soured the public mood.

The accepted assumption in integration is that that each generation is more integrated than the previous one. This is not proving to be the case with many immigrants from North Africa, Turkey, the Middle East and Pakistan. These immigrants seem to hold on to their culture in a way that keeps them from integrating at the rate that is the case for many other immigrant groups. For this group the current generation is less integrated than their predecessors. The rate of marriage to women from the old village is higher than ever. (In Canada and the USA the rate of intermarriage including for Muslims is almost 50%). So, integration hardly starts.

Reports about 'honour' killings are common as is public anger at it. Much of this is a failure by men to accept greater equality of the sexes. One official from a major Belgian city commented that the real tragedy in Belgium was Muslim Belgian women. They were not good enough for Belgian men but too good for Muslim men. Rates of imprisonment of immigrants are high. In the Netherlands 54% of prisoners are foreign born.

In Europe there is a consensus that integration has failed. It is interesting that this true regardless whether one has the multicultural model of the Dutch or the assimilationist model of the French. In my four years in Europe the accepted verities about how to achieve integration has been turned in its head. There is now an intense discussion in many countries about how to achieve more successful integration. Some of the changes include the Canadian approach to citizenship ceremonies, emphasis on language skills, knowledge of the country including its values (including the area of relations between the sexes).

Much less has been done about the high level of unemployment among certain immigrant groups. This is because the consequences of changes to labour and social policy are not acceptable to much of the public and to certain interest groups such as the trade unions. Yet, if employment prospects do not improve then the bitterness and anger of the young will not change nor will the negative attitudes of the general public towards the unemployed immigrant groups. To illustrate this point it is my belief that the public is not opposed to illegal workers. They recognize the value that they bring through their work. It is just that when they are legalized their value on the labour market is less than what they can receive in social assistance. The legal framework also remains difficult for effective immigration management.

I was asked a few years ago by a senior European Union official

about how to break through the negative perceptions of the public. I was not very helpful because, as I hope my comments illustrate, the panoply of measures needed are unlikely to garner public support because for many they strike at the heart of what it means to be European. The debate is underway. Left wing parties are most closely associated with the policies of the past and they have suffered electorally as a result. Right wing parties have gained in ascendancy. It remains to be seen what the outcome will be of the internal debate in the right between the xenophobes such as Le Pen who want an end to all immigration and those who are concerned about economic policies such as the need for labour and more flexible labour social policies and the assertion of national values.

What is encouraging is that there is at least a debate now. And the debate is at the highest levels of government. Heads of government deal with immigration repeatedly at their EU meetings. There is much activity to enhance border security particularly in the Mediterranean and in North Africa. There is an emerging realization that enforcement and removals are critical to immigration management and public acceptance of immigration. Refugee determination systems have been significantly tightened to stem abuse. Four years ago there was only an inkling that the status quo and the policies that supported it was not sustainable. What is discouraging is that the issues are so fundamental to the way that Europe sees itself that quick solutions are unlikely. The next few years will tell whether Europe has the luxury of time.

Now that I have given a rather bleak overview of Europe generally, let me add some qualifying comments. Europe is hardly uniform in its approach to immigration. Southern Europe sees immigration as mostly an economic issue, has few refugee claimants and readily resorts to amnesties to respond to the problem of illegals. Britain and Ireland are more successful in integrating immigrants at least in part because of more flexible approaches to the labour market. Eastern Europe is becoming more attractive to immigrants and refugees, although the latter make claims in order to ensure access to the more prosperous parts of the EU. There is in Europe a move in the direction that Canada set a century ago by seeking to check the criminal and security background of those seeking entry. Spain, for example, recently introduced criminality checks.

My critical comments also need to be balanced against the success of immigration and immigrant relations in many parts of Europe. Indonesian immigrants in the Netherlands have settled in well as have east Europeans throughout Europe. Immigrants from India are doing as well in Britain as they are in Canada. It is very common to see young people of different races working and playing together. Europe is quite pro refugee as we can see in the case of former Yugoslavia. For Europe (including European immigration and refugee officials) being concerned about refugee determination does not mean opposition to helping 'real' refugees. In Europe, as in Canada, it is also clear that, no matter how difficult this may be for some to accept, some groups do well and others not very well, despite facing the same challenges. The challenges on integration and all that makes

integration possible is especially applicable to these groups. Failure to achieve success redounds not just on them but on most other immigrants.

Many Europeans visit Canada to see how we go about selecting and integrating immigrants and refugees. This is important because in this area Canada is more successful than is Europe. But we should avoid advice that ignores Europe's very different history and values. The integration problems of Europe have lessons for Canada as well. Employment is so critical to integration from the perspectives of both the immigrant and the acceptance of immigrants by the public. With the abandonment of the close ties between labour market needs and the selection of economic immigrants by Canada in 1989 we have seen considerably poorer economic performance by immigrants in Canada. If Canada further expands the number of immigrants without assurances that there will be jobs a future problem is in the making. Already anecdotally we hear of complaints from immigrants that they were misled about employment prospects in Canada. Their children are unlikely to be as calm if this situation continues. Less successful immigrants mean less public support.

Europeans have come to the realization that they need to do much more to protect their borders. That is why they are proceeding so fast with tools as biometric passports and visas, regional cooperation through the EU to have a common border service, closer bilateral relationships with countries of return, tightening of refugee claimant procedures and greater focus on refugees in the regions of origin and reexamination of the legal framework that makes migration management such a difficult challenge. They know that in today's globalized world countries must work together.

Canada needs to work with Europe because if Europe does a better job on its borders it will help Canada. In areas such as interdiction Canada is the world leader and can be helpful to the Europeans. There are some who believe that there will be greater competition for skilled immigrants by wealthy countries as their working age population declines. Given the challenges that Europe faces I doubt that they can be expected to offer skilled immigrants what traditional immigrant receiving countries such as Canada, the US, Australia and New Zealand already provide. I think the greater likelihood is that such source countries as India and China will become wealthier and remove the push factors that now lead their skilled people to go abroad.

That concludes my remarks. I look forward to comments and questions. Thank you.

The Kosovar

Refugee

Movement

Introduction by Mike Molloy

In late 2002 I was working for Foreign Affairs on the Middle East Peace Process and specifically on the vexing problem of Palestinian refugees.

We had arranged a series of seminars in Geneva for Israeli and Palestinian academics, researchers and officials at a time when there was almost no dialogue between the two sides. One of the topics both groups expressed an interest in was how the countries deal with the resettlement of refugees when the international community decides that that is the right solution for a particular group of refugees.

In order to give the participants an understanding of what really happens in these circumstances, I asked my friend and colleague Rick Herringer to make a presentation on how, on very short notice, Canada organized the movement of Kosovar refugees to Canada at the request of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Rick was Immigration Canada's Director of Resettlement at that time and the person charged with directing, managing and coordinating what was called 'Operation Parasol' for the Federal Government. What follows (with his permission) are Rick's speaking notes for that occasion, with a few editorial changes and additions for our *Bulletin*.

In the introductory section Rick set out some of the elements of Canada's resettlement policy as it was in late 2002 for our Israeli and Palestinian guests. We thought this section would be of interest to our members.

Rick then proceeded to describe how this rather unusual movement was organized and delivered. The Kosovar movement differed from many of the refugee movements that preceded it in at least three significant ways:

- its short duration and the remarkable speed with which thousands were moved to this country,
- the use of sustainment centres (a military term it seems) on Canadian Forces Bases where the refugees were accommodated for extended periods after arrival, and
- the fact that right from the beginning it was understood that significant numbers might choose to be repatriated as soon as conditions in Kosovo permitted and consequently facilitation of repatriation was built right into the program.

The Israelis and Palestinians were deeply impressed with Rick Herringer's description of Canadian immigration know-how. So was I.

For this edition's historical document we have included a table of Kosovo related statistics courtesy of Citizenship and Immigration Canada.

Speaking Notes for the Kosovo Seminar, Geneva 2002

by Rick Herringer, Director of Resettlement, Citizenship and Immigration Canada

Context: Canada can respond to urgent resettlement situations

Citizenship and Immigration Canada's policies are implemented through programs that are delivered around the globe and across Canada. A range of critical factors influence departmental operations including:

- managing risks associated with globalization such as illegal migration, organized crime and terrorism;
- ensuring the appropriate humanitarian response to those forced to flee their homelands (3 durable solutions: repatriation, local integration, resettlement);
- responding to external needs, often on short notice, while at the same time ensuring continuity of programs and services;
- making sure that settlement services for newcomers are relevant, responsive and available across Canada;
- sustaining program integrity and high quality service while at the same time respecting financial and human resources constraints;
- strengthening human resources in our department by attracting, retaining and training employees, and ensuring continuity of staff.

One of the key objectives of CIC is maintaining Canada's humanitarian tradition by protecting refugees and persons in need of humanitarian assistance. Canada invariably has responded positively and generously in the face of security and humanitarian assistance crises in the past. While CIC's current operating environment allows it to respond very quickly and effectively when an international crisis arises, there is currently no formal policy to respond to international emergencies. Instead, CIC's response to date to international emergencies has been reactive in nature rather than proactive. The development of a contingency plan has resulted from the experience of Kosovo. Specifically, Canada responds to UNHCR appeals or requests by traditional allies to share the burden when refugee crises occur.

UNHCR appeals for assistance from international partners for third country resettlement primarily occur when the avenues for voluntary repatriation and local integration have been deemed inadequate to protect refugees. Despite the absence of a formal international policy, CIC has demonstrated its capability to respond in an efficient and effective manner through its current policies and the expertise of its staff. CIC is the only department within the federal government that has the capability and authority to resettle persons in an emergency situation.

Kosovo: Canada's response and participation.

- Canada implemented the *Fast Track Processing* of Refugees from Kosovo in response to the UNHCR special appeal for countries to provide temporary safe haven for Kosovar refugees fleeing Kosovo and seeking asylum in adjacent countries, namely, Albania and Macedonia.
- Canada put in place the infrastructure necessary to welcome up to 5000 refugees from Kosovo under the *Humanitarian Evacuation Program* (program code KOS) and another 2300 refugees under the *Kosovo Family Reunification program* (KOF).

The Kosovo program was undertaken in addition to Canada's regular resettlement refugee programs (10,000 per annum from abroad) that continued to respond to the needs of other refugees requiring assistance. We had roughly 10 days to put all the operations in place. It started Easter Sunday in April 1999 with the first arrivals occurring on May 3, 1999.

Early stages:

On April 20, 1999, the UNHCR reiterated that within the humanitarian evacuation program, movements to destinations outside of Europe were on hold. Despite this Canada continued with its preparations and maintained a state of alert until the situation changed. When the word came that the evacuation to destinations outside Europe would be implemented, Canada was ready. In the first 10 days after the announcement my office received over 7000 faxes and thousands of phone calls from Canadians offering housing, beds, clothing, food, and moral support...just to name a few. Within 3 weeks of the beginning of the evacuation, with the assistance of International Organization for Migration (IOM), over 5000 emergency protection cases had arrived at sustainment sites in Canada. The 2300 family reunification cases, relatives of the first 5000, arrived separately over a period of 2-3 months.

Eligibility

CIC implemented a special fast-track procedure for the processing of requests for both refugees with special needs (KOS) and family reunification refugees (KOF). The goal was to process all requests for family reunification within 15 days of family members being located. In some instances, circumstances on the ground in Europe prevented this. CIC used a range of statutory tools to address these applications for fast-track processing including the use of Minister's Permits to allow immediate entry.

Kosovar refugees with family ties in Canada and those with

special needs but no relatives in Canada were eligible for the special procedure, as well as for long-term (two year) assistance under a partnership agreement signed by CIC and Canadian non-governmental organizations. All the refugees were given the option to be repatriated, at government expense, back to Kosovo within the first 2 years of arrival. The other option was to remain in Canada permanently.

Procedures and Management

CIC Refugees Branch was the project manager, coordinating the efforts of partners within CIC at the regional and local and overseas levels, along with other government departments, provinces and non-governmental organizations. The project involved literally hundreds of staff and thousands of volunteers at every level.

Overseas

The refugee clients were referred by UNHCR or by family members to Canadian visa officers in Europe who interviewed the refugees. On average, there were five Canadian visa officers in Macedonia and four in Albania to conduct interviews.

Medical screening: In order to protect the health of Canadians and the refugees themselves, medical examinations, including a chest X-ray, were undertaken upon arrival in Canada to focus on communicable diseases or any medical condition. With the assistance of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) all persons went through a medical triage prior to departure from Macedonia and Albania.

Security screening: A preliminary security check was undertaken prior to departure for Canada. Full security and criminality checks were conducted upon arrival in Canada.

Arrival in Canada

From May 4 to May 26, 1999 alternating daily charter flights arrived at one of two Canadian military bases, CFB Trenton and CFB Greenwood. The sustainment sites housed the refugees for their first 8-12 weeks in Canada. Following this stay at the site, the refugees were linked to private sponsors and moved to communities across Canada. Our past experience with the Indochinese and Bosnian refugees indicated that the best way to assist the refugees was by working with local communities and organizations. The one difference with the Kosovo program was that the newcomers stayed longer at the sustainment sites before being moved. (*Editor's Note: By contrast refugees arriving in Canada under the Indochinese refugee program between 1979 and 1981 remained as reception centres for only two or three days before being moved to communities and sponsors across Canada.*)

Refugees arriving under the family reunification program were reunited directly with their family in Canada upon arrival.

Special needs cases, particularly for cases of severe trauma or torture were destined to locations where psychosocial counseling and other specialized services were available. Temporary accommodation was also provided in local reception centres and in communities with a range of specialized services.

Partner organizations

Role of UNHCR

Canada participated in this international effort in response to a UNHCR appeal to resettlement countries. UNHCR referred and registered prospective refugees at camps in Macedonia.

Role of IOM

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was a key partner and played a unique role in this movement.

IOM helped to identify and screen cases in refugee camps in Macedonia and determined to which country they should go.

It conducted a medical triage of refugees prior to their flight to Canada.

It provided clothing to refugees in need before departure,

It arranged all charter flights for the 5000 evacuation cases from Europe to two Canadian Forces Bases, Trenton and Greenwood, and ensured that all flights were staffed with doctors and escorts

It arranged ground transportation from CFB Trenton and Greenwood to sustainment centres on other military bases in Ontario, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

It subsequently transported refugees from the various military bases to their final destinations across Canada.

When 2200 Kosovars eventually requested repatriation it was IOM that chartered the flights, coordinated the flow of returnees from both Canada and the USA and saw the refugees back to Macedonia and thence to Kosovo.

Role of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT)

DFAIT is responsible for Canada's foreign policy, its relationship with other countries and providing consular assistance to Canadian citizens abroad. In cases of complex emergencies abroad, DFAIT quickly establishes ad hoc Task Forces, with membership determined as required. Depending on the nature of the emergency, these may be interdepartmental, as was the Task Force dealing with the Kosovo crisis. DFAIT's responsibility for foreign policy, made it a major partner in the Kosovo resettlement emergency.

Role of National Defense

The Canadian Forces provided temporary accommodation to approximately 5,000 Kosovar refugees at 7 military bases between April and August 1999. The Kosovar refugees were received at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Greenwood and Trenton. Following a brief medical examination, they were then accommodated at CF facilities at Aldershot, Borden, Gagetown, Greenwood, Halifax, Kingston and Trenton. Refugees were provided with food, lodging, clothing and arranged activities. All immigration processing took place at the bases as well.

We would never have been able to carry out Operation Parasol without DND. We had a lot of partners but the military did an

exceptional job getting this operation in place in time to receive the refugees.

Role of Health Canada

Health Canada was the lead for organizing medical screening, epidemiological investigation, medical data base operation and all health care, including emergency psycho-social support, for the Kosovar refugees during their stay at the sustainment sites and after they arrived in Canadian communities.

Role of Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)

The CFIA has a mandate to provide federal inspection services in the areas of food safety, plant health and animal health. They enforce regulations pertaining to these aspects and in the case of refugees, would be applying sections of the Health of Animals Act and Plant Protection Act, with regard to food, soil or animals coming in with the individuals. CFIA has a presence at the major airports across the country, including Toronto, Montreal, Halifax, Vancouver and others. They conducted inspections at CFB Trenton for incoming military flights.,

Role of Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA)

CCRA's mandate is to promote compliance with Canada's tax, trade, and border legislation, and regulations through communication, quality service, and responsible enforcement, thereby contributing to the economic and social well-being of Canadians. In this large-scale refugee influx, CCRA ensured close coordination with DFAIT and CIC. Extra staff was made available at border entry points for processing arrivals.

Role of The Canadian Red Cross (CRC)

The Canadian Red Cross is officially recognized by the federal government as a voluntary relief society, auxiliary to public authorities. Its aims are:

- a) to provide protection and assistance to victims of armed conflict and disasters,
- b) to prevent and alleviate human suffering.

The Red Cross worked with CIC to settle medical evacuees that were moved to Canada following the first outbreak of conflict in former Yugoslavia. During the Kosovo crisis the Red Cross worked on the CF bases to assist the newcomers and to coordinate volunteers.

The Red Cross was the lead non-governmental agency that CIC worked with to identify, train and staff all the volunteers used during the operation. The Red Cross also did an exceptional job managing, in coordination with CIC staff, all the thousands of volunteers

Role of Sponsorship Agreement Holders (SAH)

One of the first decisions taken was that all the KOS/KOF refugees would be designated 'special needs' cases due to the trauma they had endured, and that they would be treated as 'Joint Assistance' cases that would be matched with private sponsors. *(Editors Note: Joint Assistance is a settlement strategy for refugees with special needs who benefit from the personalized support of a*

sponsoring group and the full assistance of various government income support and services programs.) This decision was taken in coordination with the selected Sponsorship Agreement Holder representatives of the private sponsorship community and a refugee advocacy group called the Canadian Council for Refugees who committed themselves to recruit, inform, and support sponsoring groups.

CIC provided funding to contract Sponsorship Coordinators in all provinces of destination and representatives from the private sponsorship community took responsibility to recruit qualified individuals, and sponsoring organizations willing to provide space and support to the coordinators. CIC's Resettlement Branch maintained support to the network of coordinators and provided information updates, training materials, and problem-solving assistance. Contracting, supervisory and office location decisions for the Sponsorship Coordinators were taken by CIC's regional or local offices.

Role of Service Provider Organizations (SPO)

There are over 300 not-for-profit community-based service provider organizations across Canada whose prime mandate is to assist refugees and immigrants to settle and integrate into various communities across the country. They have over 30 years of experience in providing a wide range of settlement and integration programs in partnership with all levels of government and with community organizations as well as ethnic communities.

The SPOs assisted the Kosovar newcomers by providing settlement and employment services, family and children's programs, skills for work training, language training, health care, and community education.

Role of Community and Volunteer Organizations

There are numerous community and volunteer organizations across Canada who provided assistance with community integration for refugee resettlement at the local level. Individual Canadians helped by sponsoring refugees, often in collaboration with NGOs, to ensure the newcomers received the assistance they needed while in Canada. Individual financial donations and donations of goods and services were also provided by citizens.

Evaluation

Canada's response to Kosovo has been evaluated within the CIC and by academic researchers and others. In March 2002, CIC convened a useful conference to review contingency planning with partners. This contingency planning process will continue.

Comments 1: as seen by a participant

The week before Easter 1999 saw a resumption of the annual Four Countries' Meeting after a hiatus of several years. This involved the most senior immigration officials of Canada, the United States, Britain and Australia. The United States hosted the meeting in San Francisco. An issue in the background of the meeting was Kosovo and the outflow of Kosovar Albanian refugees to Macedonia and Albania. The meeting took place after Madame Ogata, the High Commissioner for Refugees, had withdrawn her request to States to accept refugees on a temporary basis to assist Macedonia until they could return to Kosovo. Therefore, it appeared that this was not an issue that would have to be dealt with. But it was discussed.

The officials from each of the countries agreed quickly that evacuation was not the answer. For all kinds of reasons, including the fact that financial assistance went much further in Macedonia and Albania than in their own countries, the preferred solution was financial and other assistance to Macedonia and Albania. Little did we know at that time that within a few days each of our countries would be taking considerable numbers of these refugees.

After the meeting finished Madame Ogata decided that there should be an evacuation to other countries. On Saturday evening (the day before Easter) I received a phone call from the Minister's Office telling me that the Minister (Lucienne Robillard) would be calling me shortly as soon as she arrived back from China. The subject was a proposal for Canada to accept Kosovar refugees.

When Madame Robillard called, tired after her long flight back, we discussed the matter. Madame Robillard was not yet current on the behind the scenes developments. She questioned why we should not help Macedonia and Albania rather than accept the Kosovars into Canada. She had decided several months earlier as part of a review of Canada's refugee policy against temporary refugee protection status. This was fine for Europe but not for Canada with its policy of permanent resettlement instead of temporary status. We agreed that the preferred solution was assistance to Macedonia and Albania. She said she would call the Prime Minister and get back to me.

A few hours later her office called me to say that the Prime Minister had spoken to the US president and that Canada was taking 5,000 Kosovar refugees. The next day, Easter Sunday, I attended a meeting at External Affairs and the plan to accept Kosovar refugees began to take shape.

Let me make a few scattered personal observations about the Kosovar movement.

The decision to accept the Kosovar refugees rather than provide assistance to Macedonia and Albania was a result of the so-called CNN effect. The bombing of Yugoslavia was supposed to stop rather than accelerate the outflow of refugees. Yet, by watching CNN and other channels one might conclude the opposite. As well, seeing refugees on trains being forced to leave Kosovo was

an uncomfortable reminder to Europeans of their own recent history. Thus, the evacuation of Kosovars was a very political response that overrode the practical wisdom and experience of refugee experts.

For Canada the policy issue remained unclear. The Kosovars were coming under temporary status, as officially the Kosovars would be returning to their homes as soon as possible. A policy to allow them to remain would play into the hands of Milosovic who wanted to rid Kosovo of its Albanian population. As Canada did not have a temporary status policy, this approach fitted badly within a permanent resettlement framework.

Operationally, the Kosovar movement had many aspects of interest. IOM gained prestige from its prompt and generally helpful response to the needs of States. The UNHCR lost prestige. It was unwieldy, slow and off the mark. As Raph Girard notes in his comments, the refugees returned home despite the UNHCR. In Canada we did not want to have the refugees going back until the UNHCR said it was safe to do so. As the UNHCR was completely out of step with what was happening on the ground when the refugees returned en masse, we were faced with demands, including threats of hunger strikes, by Kosovars who wanted to go home.

For CIC the Kosovar movement allowed it to shine in public approval, a rare enough occurrence. Public support was strong. The provinces were entirely on board (especially after CIC agreed to pay all costs). Enthusiasm was incredibly high among staff across the country and in the Balkans. Just one example is the manager of a reception centre who, after showing me around in the early evening, ran rather than walked back to his office. A lot of people did a lot of running and thoroughly enjoyed it. After a depressing period of cutbacks and reorganization CIC was doing what it was very good at and this event allowed it to put the negativity of recent years behind it. (As an aside the fleeting nature of popularity is apparent when one realizes that only a few months later the Chinese boats started arriving in British Columbia. The goodwill evaporated overnight).

Gerry Van Kessel

Director General, Refugees 1997-2001

Comments 2: Policy context

On March 23, 1999, I was evacuated to Ottawa from my post as Head of Mission at the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade because of the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. In the previous eighteen months, many of the staff of the Embassy had spent a great deal of time and effort in tracking the situation in Kosovo. I had personally been on patrol in the region with Canadian military and had conducted consultations with the Serb and Kosovar leadership on many occasions.

When the mass expulsion of Kosovars by the Yugoslav

paramilitaries began in late March, I was sent back to Macedonia and Albania as Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy's delegate along with H el ene Corneau of CIDA. Our objective was to conduct a needs assessment to enable the government to decide on the kind and scope of Canadian aid that should go to help relieve the plight of the hundreds of thousands of refugees that were flooding into the two countries.

In the confusion that we found, which saw aid organizations scrambling to meet the basic needs of the refugees and the refugees themselves trying to find and reunite with their families, the first priority was to organize food, shelter and medical care. Any question of resettlement abroad for these unfortunates was very much premature. Mme Corneau and I reported to Ministers that Canada should quickly provide large quantities of material aid and financial aid through the NGOs on the ground.

Against this context, the Macedonian government headed by Kiro Gligorov, reacted against the influx of thousands of ethnic Albanians into Macedonia which they feared would upset the delicate ethnic balance between resident Slavs and Albanians. Gligorov insisted that the UN organize the international community to relocate outside of Macedonia any numbers of refugees in excess of 20,000—which number they had settled as the maximum which could be housed even temporarily in Macedonia. Without relocation, Macedonia threatened to close the borders to the new arrivals leaving them at the latter at the mercy of the elements in the sparse no-man's land between Macedonia and southern Serbia.

On my return to Canada in mid-April, I was alarmed to find that Canada was actively considering bringing 5000 of these refugees to Canada. In making my rounds of Ministers, to brief them on the results of our mission, I called on Mme Lucienne Robillard at CIC. I attempted to convince her that, since we had no means of providing temporary assistance except through our resettlement program, a Canadian program in the conditions that existed was very much premature and probably unnecessary.

I argued that our money would go a lot farther and be more effective in ensuring protection if we were to spend it in the region. I argued that this was not the kind of conflict for which resettlement was an appropriate durable solution. On the contrary, the expatriation of the Kosovars was likely to be short term, making repatriation the most desirable objective. All going well, it could even be achieved in the medium term. Mme Robillard agreed with my assessment but indicated that the Prime Minister himself had committed to take 5,000 refugees and that her department was going to arrange to do just that. In fact my administrative staff that was already on the ground in Skopje had been directed to create a base of operations for the program and visa officers were in the process of being recruited to begin selections as soon as possible.

I returned to Macedonia almost immediately to take charge of the Canadian mission in Skopje and on arrival had occasion to meet Mme Sagato Ogata the UN High Commissioner for Refugees who had undertaken a fact finding mission in the region. I

argued that even if some relocation of Kosovars was necessary to convince the Macedonians to keep the border open, such relocations should be confined to neighboring countries because all that was needed was temporary asylum—not the kind of permanent resettlement that we, the Americans and the Australian programs were accustomed to offer. I recommended that she reconsider transcontinental relocation of the Kosovars because they would not likely be in exile from their country for very long. To my surprise, Mme Ogata agreed and announced publicly that for the time being, she would not engage the Canadian, American or Australian resettlement offers given the difficulty that would ensue in organizing repatriation once the crisis has passed.

Unfortunately, just before the end of April, the Macedonians intervened. Because of the slow pace of relocation of the Kosovars to European destinations, they closed the border to the daily horde of new arrivals which placed Mme Ogata in an untenable position. She called to inform me that circumstances had forced her to engage the transatlantic countries and Australia in order to convince the Macedonian authorities to relent. As a result, our airlift began in earnest in early May and by the 26th the International Region of CIC, with its well known expertise in such operations, had completed the assigned task of selecting and transporting to Canada more than 5000 Kosovars.

Two weeks later, on June 9, a truce was struck between NATO and the Milosevic government. The ink was barely dry on that agreement before spontaneous repatriation of mind boggling speed began. The refugee crisis literally evaporated before the astonished eyes of the UNHCR, the Macedonians and the rest of the international community. Some 700,000 refugees packed up and moved home against the advice of the UNHCR that feared the worst because of the widespread use of anti personnel land mines.,

Canada had probably spent more than \$150 million to provide protection to Kosovar refugees whose estrangement from their own country had lasted barely seven weeks. If that was the price of keeping the Macdonian border open, it would have been worth it. However, no serious attempt was made by any government, including our own, to persuade the Macedonians to be more generous with regard to temporary asylum. I conclude that it was more important to NATO countries to highlight the inhumane actions of the Yugoslav authorities by a high profile relocation program than to design a more rational humanitarian response to the real needs of the Kosovars.

Over the postwar period, our resettlement efforts had usually been well thought through and effective. All I can say about the Kosovo program is that it must be the exception that proves the rule.

Raphael Girard

Kosovar Refugee Statistics [Courtesy CIC]

SUSTAINMENT SITE

	Arrivals	Repatriated
Gagetown	1072	87
Aldershot	896	40
Halifax	404	79
Trenton	578	50
Borden	933	213
Kingston	1168	49
Sites Total	5051	
Total Repatriation from Sites	518	
Destined to Communities	4533	

KOS

- a. Communities in (province)
- b. Targets
- c. Arrivals
- d. Repatriated
- e. Balance
- f. Intend to be repatriated

	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>	<u>d</u>	<u>e</u>	<u>f</u>
NFLD		135	75	37	38	9
N.S.		150	104	18	86	
N.B.		150	141	29	112	9
PEI		100	105	45	60	
QUE		1200	1143	336	807	4
ONT		1550	1295	374	921	43
MAN		350	290	87	203	22
SASK		300	322	114	208	10
ALTA		550	547	230	317	12
BC		550	529	153	376	7
total		5035	4551	1423	3128	116

KOF

- A. Communities in (province)
- B. Arrivals
- C. Repatriated
- D. Remaining
- E. Intend to be repatriated

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>
NFLD		5		5	
N.S.		51	19	32	
N.B.		18	1	17	
PEI		1		1	
QUE		169	17	152	8
ONT		1352	180	1172	2
MAN		88	19	69	
SASK		44	11	33	
ALTA		143	11	132	
BC		421	77	344	
total		2292	335	1957	10